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Abstract 
Nominalism (the thesis that there are no abstract objects) faces the task of 
explaining away the ontological commitments of applied mathematical 
statements. This paper reviews an argument from the philosophy of logic that 
focuses on this task and which has been used as an objection to certain specific 
formulations of nominalism. The argument as it is developed in this paper aims 
to show that nominalism in general does not have the epistemological 
advantages its defendants claim it has. I distinguish between two strategies that 
are available to the nominalist: The Evaluation Programme, which tries to 
preserve the common truth-values of mathematical statements even if there are 
no mathematical objects, and Fictionalism, which denies that mathematical 
sentences have significant truth-values. It is argued that the tenability of both 
strategies depends on the nominalist’s ability to account for the notion of 
consequence. This is a problem because the usual meta-logical explications of 
consequence do themselves quantify over mathematical entities. While 
nominalists of both varieties may try to appeal to a primitive notion of 
consequence, or, alternatively, to primitive notions of logical or structural 
possibilities, such measures are objectionable. Even if we are equipped with a 
notion of either consequence or possibility that is primitive in the relevant 
sense, it will not be strong enough to account for the consequence relation 
required in classical mathematics. These examinations are also useful in 
assessing the possible counter-intuitive appeal of the argument from the 
philosophy of logic. 
__________________________ 
1. Introduction 
The nominalist’s aim is to revamp ontology by denying the existence of abstract 
objects. The constructive part of the project is to explain how talk and reasoning 
about abstract entities, their non-existence notwithstanding, can still be helpful 
in our dealing with the world of concrete things. Some expressions that 
 2 
purportedly refer to abstract entities can reasonably be argued to be merely 
convenient paraphrases for more complicated assertions about concrete objects. 
They are consequently of little worry to the nominalist. But some abstract 
objects and their uses stubbornly resist an easy nominalistic explanation in this 
vein. The most notorious case is that of classical mathematics with its scientific 
(and everyday) applications to concrete phenomena. 
Many philosophers have been motivated to try and tackle this problem for 
mainly epistemological reasons: Suppose, for the moment, that there were such 
things as numbers—how could we claim to know anything about them? How 
could our beliefs, that are in the end nothing but states of concrete organisms, 
be reliably correlated with facts about things that exist outside space and time 
and are assumed to be causally inactive and impassive?1 I think that the 
nominalists’ worries have to be taken seriously and their quest to rid the world 
of this epistemological problem respected. Like many others, I think that they 
have so far not succeeded and that we should rather face this problem directly. 
How we might manage to do so is a different question, to which I have tried to 
contribute my share elsewhere (Wilholt 2004). In this paper, I will pursue two 
quite different aims. 
The first aim is to survey a certain type of argument that intends to show 
nominalism’s incapability of providing a solution to the aforementioned 
epistemological worries. This argument, which might be called ‘the argument 
from the philosophy of logic’, concentrates on the notion of consequence (and 
other related notions) employed in nominalistic theories. It shows how this 
notion, if regarded under the metaphysical restrictions of nominalism, 
incorporates all the epistemological problems that the nominalists wanted to 
get rid of in the first place. This argument has been put forward against specific 
varieties of nominalism and it has been taken to indicate a fundamental 
intricate entanglement of logic, modality and ontology (cf. especially Shapiro 
1993, 1997: ch. 7; also Resnik 1983, 1985, Parsons 1990). My survey of the 
argument from the philosophy of logic in this paper is intended to provide a 
presentation of it that is independent of the technicalities of one or the other 
nominalistic project and to show that it can in one way or another be raised 
against any version of nominalism. It thus amounts to an objection against 
epistemological motivations for nominalism in general. Underlying this effort is 
a second, equally important aim. The argument from the philosophy of logic 
seems oddly counter-intuitive. (How can a consideration of the innocent notion 
of consequence have so much significance for our theory of what there is?) I 
                                                 
1 See Field (1989, ch. 1, §4B and ch. 7, §2) for a more detailed presentation of this reliabilist 
version of the access problem. 
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will explore some of the intuitions involved in order to explain why the 
argument seems so counter-intuitive at times and why it is nonetheless valid. It 
should be emphasised that I will limit the discussion to matters directly 
pertinent to the argument from the philosophy of logic as I understand it, and 
that the paper must therefore not be mistaken for a survey of nominalism in 
general.  
Epistemological concerns are not the only possible reason for being a 
nominalist. For example, a philosopher in pursuit of ontological parsimony per 
se might favour nominalism even when she is not interested in epistemology at 
all. The argument from the philosophy of logic has no force against this kind of 
nominalism. It works as an objection only against the widespread 
epistemological motivations of nominalism. To me, this makes it no less 
interesting, because these motivations offer a prima facie perspicuous reason why 
it might be better to omit certain objects from our ontology and to me this is 
what makes nominalism an important position to deal with. But it is a 
restriction of the argument from the philosophy of logic that must be 
acknowledged.  
This restriction will also provide me with a defining constraint for the 
kind of nominalism that is treated in this paper. There are varying opinions 
concerning the question regarding what resources exactly the consistent 
nominalist is restricted to. Arguing against nominalism, I will be generous 
regarding this point. But I will insist that the nominalist must at least abstain 
from using resources that imply the same (or worse) problems of epistemic access 
as mathematical entities. Mathematical entities will thus serve as paradigmatic 
abstract objects. This has the advantage that though views concerning the exact 
meaning of the concept “abstract” may differ, numbers, sets, functions and their 
like all seem to fall safely within its extension. 
I will leave out almost all the details of how the nominalist may explain 
the applicability of mathematics, and concentrate on only one aspect: How can 
we distinguish statements like 
[P]  2 + 2 = 4 
from statements like  
[Q]  2 + 2 = 5  
if the entities they purport to refer to do not exist? I presuppose that some such 
distinction must underlie every successful nominalistic account of the 
usefulness of mathematical statements. Some nominalists may want to argue 
that sentences like [P] are in fact true, even though no such thing as the number 
2 exists, and thus that the difference between sentences [P] and [Q] is just that 
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one is true and the other false. The truth of [P] must then be explained in some 
non-standard way, and the nominalists in question must explain how. I will call 
this branch of nominalism the “Evaluation Programme”, since it necessarily 
involves a truth-evaluation of all mathematical statements by non-referential 
means.2 Other nominalists will prefer to insist that [P] cannot be true when the 
singular terms “2”, etc. do not have referents. They will have to provide us with 
a non-standard account of how statements like [P] are distinguished from 
statements like [Q]. Following Hartry Field, I will label this second kind of 
nominalism “Fictionalism”. 
2. An Introduction to the Evaluation Programme 
The Evaluation Programme is not overtly popular within current philosophy of 
mathematics. However, below I will point out a way to conceive of Geoffrey 
Hellman’s Modal Structuralism as a very nuanced and sophisticated version of 
it. What is more, my personal experience is that belief in the Evaluation 
Programme is very widespread within the mathematical community. We 
should therefore take it seriously and try to find a convincing elaboration. 
This elaboration must consist in an account for the truth of true 
mathematical statements (and for the falsity of the false ones) without reference 
to abstract entities. In general, the truth-values of mathematical sentences seem 
to be determined and fixed.3 The evaluation programme must identify the 
principle that is responsible for this determination. That is, it must specify a 
principle by which the values TRUE and FALSE are distributed over the totality 
of well-formed mathematical sentences. 
In order to account for the empirical fact that doing mathematics is 
possible for finite beings, the principle of truth-value distribution sought by the 
Evaluation Programme should be some kind of rule (or set of rules)—for a rule 
is the only thing that could make this infinite assignation humanly manageable. 
It is only due to the fact that mathematics is axiomatisable that there actually is 
a candidate for a rule that could serve as an appropriate evaluation principle. 
The rule must be some variety of the principle: “For a mathematical sentence, to 
be true is to follow from a suitable set of axioms.” I will assume that this 
principle can not be interpreted as “to be true is to be formally deducible from a 
                                                 
2 The name is borrowed from Detlefsen (1986, esp. p. 33), who distinguishes two basic strategies 
for the explanation of the applicability of mathematics: a realist one, called “Interpretation”, and 
an instrumentalist one called “Evaluation”. 
3 Some may argue that there are exceptions to this rule (such as the continuum hypothesis). But 
this does not weaken the point here as long as there remains an infinite body of determined 
sentences when we have subtracted the exceptions. 
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suitable set of axioms”. The well-known problems of incompleteness would 
force us to abandon bivalence for mathematical statements if we adopted this 
simplistic formalism, and I take it for granted that most present day 
philosophers find this very unattractive. I therefore presuppose that the 
Evaluation Programme must rely on a semantic consequence relation. 
According to the semantic conception, a sentence X follows from a class of 
sentences K if and only if X is true under every such interpretation that makes 
all the elements of K true. This conception thus quantifies over interpretations 
each of which involves a universe of discourse. Naturally, it is of great 
importance what the resource of objects for these universes of discourse looks 
like. Suppose, e.g., that this resource consisted of only 999 999 different 
objects—then the sentence “Brutus is an honourable man” would follow 
logically from a statement to the effect that there are 1 000 000 different things 
(formulated by means of logical vocabulary). To avoid such absurdities, the 
object-resources for the interpretations must be as rich as possible.4 
In contemporary logic, this requirement is met by agreeing on the set-
theoretical universe as the resource for interpretation. The all-purpose objects 
furnishing all kinds of universes of discourse for all kinds of interpretations are 
set-theoretical constructs, taken from the ontology of ZFC, our standard set 
theory. Obviously, the vertiginous ontology of ZFC constitutes a paradigm 
collection of just those abstract things whose existence the nominalist denies. At 
least for the time being, we must therefore treat the semantic consequence 
relation } as unattainable to the nominalist. 
3. A Common Sense Approach to Consequence 
The Evaluation Programme thus faces the difficult problem of explaining what 
“following from the axioms” could mean for a nominalist if our best theories of 
logical consequence presuppose an ontology of abstract objects. There is, 
however, a possibility to overcome this problem that has, to my mind, initially a 
very strong intuitive appeal. It involves an appeal to common sense. Don’t we 
all, the proponent of the Evaluation Programme could say, have a very clear 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, the problem would be much restricted if we confined ourselves to first-order 
logical consequence. It would suffice to make sure that the resource consists of (countably) 
infinitely many objects. For it would then follow from the downward Löwenheim-Skolem 
theorems that every first-order theory that has a model at all had a model composable from our 
object-resource. However, we will not limit our interest to first-order consequence and do not 
believe the sympathiser of the Evaluation Programme should do so, given her dependence on 
“suitable sets of axioms”. Not even arithmetic can be formalised by a finite set of first-order 
axioms. 
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idea of what it means for one sentence to follow from another? Logical 
consequence is a relation that, as a matter of fact, holds between some 
sentences. Obviously, we have the ability to grasp this relation. We have also 
devised theoretical tools to study this relation, like proof theory and model 
theory, that happen to presuppose abstract objects. But this does not force us to 
see the consequence relation itself contaminated by abstract ontology. How 
could nominalism, a very straightforward and fundamental thesis about what 
kinds of things there are, be doomed because contemporary formal logicians 
happen to insist on the ontology of set theory? In short: The advocate of the 
Evaluation Programme could claim that we do simply have an intuitively clear 
notion of logical consequence that is independent of metalogical theory and can 
be taken as primitive.  
To say that some notion is primitive can mean one of (at least) three 
things, and it is important to be clear about in just what sense a concept is 
claimed or required to be primitive. (i) To claim that a notion is primitive may 
just mean that it will not be defined or explained in the theory at issue. (ii) Or it 
may mean that it refers to a basic element of the subject matter under 
discussion, in the sense of an element that is not composed of or constituted by 
any elements less complex than itself. (iii) Thirdly, it may mean that the 
application of the concept in question is epistemologically harmless, i.e. that we 
know whether or not it applies in every relevant case and it is possible to 
explain how we know this. 
In our case, the purpose of the assumption that logical consequence is a 
primitive notion is to disperse the ontological worries that come with the 
semantic conception of consequence—that it contains an implicit quantification 
over the objects of ZFC. As my argument is restricted to epistemological 
motivations of nominalism, I will assume that the worries about quantification 
over the cumulative hierarchy stem from the concern that pure sets are not the 
kind of thing that we can plausibly know anything about. Therefore, in order to 
ultimately dispense with these worries, the claim must be that the notion of 
consequence is primitive in the third sense. 
I regard the belief in an independent and immediately clear notion of 
consequence as an important factor in the nominalism issue, though it is hardly 
discussed in the literature (with some notable exceptions5). To assess its initial 
plausibility and thereafter probe its durability, consider the following quite 
plain example of a sentence following from two axioms. 
                                                 
5 Discussions akin to what follows can be found in Rosemarie Rheinwald’s excellent book (1984, 
ch. II) as well as in Putnam (1975, §3) and Parsons (1990, §§3-4). 
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The “theory” generated by these two axioms is the familiar theory of half-
order. It is a theory about only one dyadic relation, <. There are two axioms, I 
and T, demanding irreflexivity and transitivity: 
I ≡df   ∀x  ¬ x < x. 
T ≡df   ∀x ∀y ∀z  ((x < y ∧ y < z) → x < z). 
A typical example for a half order is the proper subset relation, ⊊. Now 
consider the fact that the sentence A (for “asymmetry”) below follows logically 
from I and T, regardless of what else than the axioms is true of “<”.  
A ≡df   ∀x ∀y  ¬(x < y ∧ y < x). 
We can assure ourselves that it does so by means of a simple indirect 
consideration: Suppose that within an arbitrary half-order, there existed some x 
and y such that x < y and at the same time y < x. Then, no matter what kind of 
relation < is over and above being a half-order, it would have to follow from 
transitivity that x < x. But according to irreflexivity, this can never be the case 
with any half-order relation. The situation envisaged at the outset of our little 
deliberation can therefore never occur. 
I agree that in this case, we can ascertain that any sentence of the form A 
follows logically from sentences of the form I and T without having to invoke 
metalogic or any theoretically explicated concept of consequence. The example 
seems to show that the understanding that we can achieve in this way 
transcends the characteristics of specific relations like ⊊ and provides insight 
into the consequence relations between propositions that are due to their logical 
form. It is consequences of this kind that nourish the intuition that we possess a 
notion of consequence that is well understood and epistemologically harmless.  
In the simple argument that we have used to arrive at this conclusion, we 
have implicitly quantified over binary relations on arbitrary totalities of objects, 
the characteristics of which were not further specified. We have simply 
reflected that if an arbitrary binary relation is irreflexive and transitive, then it is 
asymmetric.  
In order to reconstruct this formally, let us express the statement that I 
applies to an arbitrary binary relation R on a totality of objects M simply as the 
restriction of quantifiers in I to M and the replacement of every occurrence of < 
in I by R. I will signify this result of restriction and replacement by MRI . 
M
RI  ≡df  ∀x  (x belongs to M → ¬ R(x, x)). 
M
RT  and 
M
RA  are to be formed analogously. With the aid of these expressions we 
can now give a truly simple and straightforward reconstruction of the 
consequence relation that we have in fact examined as follows: 
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[I+TÊA]           ∀M ∀R (R is a binary relation on totality M → 
  (( MRI  ∧ 
M
RT ) → 
M
RA )). 
It seems to be the case that there is an understanding of the consequence 
relation that makes it accessible to direct and pre-theoretical reflection 
foregoing metalogical investigations of structured sequences of symbol types 
(proofs), sets of sets (interpretations) or other sophisticated mathematicalia. I 
assume that the possibility of this straightforward understanding is exactly 
what fuels the intuition that we do possess an independent and immediately 
clear notion of consequence. 
There might still be worries as to whether quantification over “totalities” 
and “relations” could possibly be available to the nominalist at all. However, I 
will assume that first-order totalities of concrete things and relations among 
these can themselves be understood as sufficiently concrete. I think this is 
plausible enough, considering that we are here concerned with a nominalistic 
reservation against abstract entities that rests on epistemological grounds. Since 
we have causal contact with collections, groups and aggregates of concrete 
things, an epistemology of totalities of concrete objects and their relations seems 
much less problematic than one for, say, pure sets. At any rate, I will grant so 
much to the nominalist that she can plausibly view some instances of the 
consequence relation as cases amenable to our straightforward understanding 
and thus graspable independently of any theory that includes commitment to 
abstract objects. 
The hard problem for the straightforward understanding of consequence 
as envisaged in [I+TÊA] is a different one. The difficulty is simple (but 
devastating): Analyses like [I+TÊA] face the threat of being trivially satisfied. 
This would be the case if there were no totality in the whole universe that was 
half-ordered by any relation. For then, MRI  ∧ 
M
RT  would be false for all M and R, 
such that [I+TÊA] would be trivially true. So likewise, it would be true that 
every arbitrary assertion whatsoever followed from I and T if understood 
analogously to [I+TÊA]. 
Of course, the threat is not factual in the special case of [I+TÊA] itself: We 
know many relations that constitute genuine half-orders among concrete 
objects. But simple examples for the intuitive clarity of the notion of 
consequence, like the present example of the theory of the half-order relation, 
are deceptive. 
Contrast this with the example of “following from the axioms of 
arithmetic”. Let D be the conjunction of the Dedekind-Peano second order 
axioms of arithmetic. Analogously to our construction of [I+TÊA], we will 
understand under MRoD ,  the result of restricting all quantifiers in D to totality M 
 9 
and replacing all occurrences of the successor relation in D with R and all 
occurrences of zero in D with o. (If you like, you can read MRoD ,  as “M with R as 
successor relation and o as zero is an ω-sequence.”) Now consider the following 
attempt to capture the content of “Assertion φ follows from the axioms of 
arithmetic” analogously to [I+TÊA]: 
[DÊφ] ∀M ∀R ∀o ((R is a binary relation on totality M ∧ o belongs to M)  
  → ( MRoD ,  → 
M
Ro,φ )). 
( MRo,φ  stands for the result of the same replacements and restrictions in φ as 
described above for D.)  
Now if there are no totalities M at all possessing an element o and a binary 
relation R such that MRoD , , then [DÊφ] would be trivially true for any arbitrary 
assertion φ. In this case, it is far less than obvious that this will not happen to 
the nominalist, i.e. that there are in fact concrete totalities meeting the 
antecedent conditions (forming an ω-sequence). What would such a totality 
consist of—the atoms of the universe? Space time points? The latter would 
probably be the safest bet—there are more than enough of them to save the day 
for [DÊφ], provided they count as concrete objects. 
However, I think it does not matter much whether we decide that space 
time points are concrete objects or not (cf. Field, 1989, ch. 6). The severity of the 
problem comes to the fore either way. For it is simply unacceptable to analyse 
the notion of consequence in such a way that whether or not some sentence 
follows from another depends on what kinds of totalities of concrete objects 
there are in the world. We are sure that it does not follow from the axioms of 
arithmetic that all even numbers are prime numbers, whether or not there exist 
infinite totalities of concrete entities that constitute ω-sequences. We do not 
think that it would follow, even in a world where not a single such totality 
existed.  
Coming from a realist, the foregoing argument requires comment. For it 
might seem that any realistic alternative will fare no better with regard to the 
dependence of logical consequence on what there is, and that the difference will 
simply be that a realist position will make the aforementioned arithmetical 
consequence dependent on whether or not there exist infinite totalities of 
abstract entities that constitute ω-sequences. Is this not equally objectionable? 
The standard, realistically interpreted model-theoretic account of logical 
consequence, for instance, makes consequence dependent on the existence of 
sets and has in fact been rejected as an adequate explication for reasons related 
to this problem (cf. Etchemendy, 1990). But consider the following difference 
between the nominalistic and realistic situations. What seems intuitively 
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objectionable about the nominalist’s use of the straightforward analysis of 
consequence is that it makes logical consequence counterfactually dependent on 
what there is, or in other words, that it turns it into a contingent matter. In 
contrast, set-theoretical realists typically maintain that whatever sets there are 
exist necessarily, such that under the model-theoretic perspective, consequence 
is not a contingent matter. If the well-known oddities of ZFC have made you 
sceptical of set-theoretical realism, a more convincing realist alternative might 
be realism about structures. I think that for such a realism, a corresponding 
straightforward analysis of consequence is not a hopeless matter.6 If there are 
such things as abstract structures, they are arguably the same in every possible 
world, such that this perspective would not make logical consequence 
counterfactually dependent on what structures there are—not in the way that 
counterfactual dependence is usually understood. (Besides, even if one does not 
agree that whatever abstract structures there are exist necessarily, it may seem 
much less objectionable that whether or not one mathematical truth follows 
logically from another depends on what abstract structures exist, then that it 
depends on how many objects the universe contains.) These remarks do of 
course not establish a consistent realistic conception of consequence, which is 
not the purpose of this paper. They are only intended to show that the 
situations of realism and nominalism with respect to the aforementioned 
argument are not analogous. 
For the purposes of nominalism, the straightforward analysis of 
consequence in the sense of [DÊφ] is unhelpful, if it is understood as 
quantifying over concrete totalities. If I am right and this analysis is what we 
implicitly refer to when we rehearse considerations about the consequence 
relation like the one presented above for the case of A following from I ∧ T, then 
it follows that our intuition that we have an immediate access to the notion of 
consequence (and can therefore treat it as primitive) is based on an illusion that 
may be caused by our preference for simple examples. In all cases where the 
premises of a consequence specify a structure that threatens to exceed the 
richness of concrete reality (as is easily the case with mathematical inferences), 
an implicit quantification over concrete totalities just will not do. 
4. Going Modal 
The nominalist may initiate a modal evasion manoeuvre. As a replacement for 
[DÊφ] for example, she would then start from the following idea: In saying that 
                                                 
6 I.e., a version of [DÊφ] with M ranging over abstract structures, o over places in structures and 
R over relations between places in structures. 
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φ follows from D we mean that, if there was a concrete totality constituting an ω-
sequence, then, without fail, φ would have to hold for it. A very sophisticated 
implementation of this idea can be found in Geoffrey Hellman’s doctrine of 
Modal Structuralism (Hellman, 1989). 
Hellman’s programme is to provide a modal structural interpretation of 
mathematical theories that eliminates their reference to mathematical entities 
(ibid., 6). Even so, it may be fair to note that he does not call himself a 
nominalist and ultimately ends up expressing serious reservations about the 
nominalistic project (ibid., 116). However, the initial eliminative motivation 
makes it plausible to regard his doctrine as an improvement and elaboration of 
the Evaluation Programme and thus to include it in my assessment of 
nominalism’s prospects (it should be noted that I am not the first one to do so, 
cf. Burgess and Rosen, 1997, sections II.C and III.A.I.c). 
In response to the threat of trivial satisfaction, it would be comfortable to 
supplement [DÊφ] with a categorical safeguard in the fashion of  
 ∃M ∃R ∃o  MRoD , . 
But, as we have seen, for a nominalist this would be a precarious statement 
about the kinds of totalities that exist in the actual world. Mathematics cannot 
depend on what kind of structures there actually are (adopting Hellman’s 
“structures” for our totalities-cum-relations). However, says Hellman, it 
depends on which structures are possible: 
[M]athematics is the free exploration of structural possibilities, 
pursued by (more or less) rigorous deductive means. (Hellman 1989, 
6) 
Now, according to Hellman, we can provide a categorical safeguard for such 
explorations by means of a modalised statement. Whether or not any ω-
sequence is actually realised, what matters is that it is possible that there was 
one. For Hellman, this must be a basic assumption of the science of arithmetic 
and takes the following form (ibid., 27): 
[C] ◇ ∃M ∃R ∃o MRoD , . 
Of course, simplistic consequence notions like [DÊφ] could still be trivially 
satisfied, given [C] (viz., if there does not exist an ω-sequence in the actual 
 12 
world). Not so for Hellman’s slightly more sophisticated analysis of “following 
from the axioms”, which is likewise modalised:7 
[H] □ ∀M ∀R ∀o ( MRoD ,  → MRo,φ ). 
Hellman understands these modalisations as providing a modal structural 
interpretation of φ, consisting of one categorical [C] and one hypothetical 
component [H]. In words that are not Hellman’s own, his Modal Structuralism 
can be rakishly described as follows: When a mathematician states φ, what she 
really, ultimately asserts is [H] and, as [H]’s backing, [C]. This is how Hellman 
can declare φ to have a determinate truth value and explain this without 
invoking numbers: φ inherits the truth value of its modal structural 
interpretation, [C]∧[H]; φ itself is not given an interpretation, and [H] and [C] 
quantify over other things, not numbers. In this vein, arithmetical sentences are 
provided with truth values without being interpreted; and this is why 
Hellman’s eliminativism, if understood as a nominalistic endeavour, qualifies 
as a sophisticated version of the Evaluation Programme. 
Naturally, the question arises how Hellman’s modality is to be understood 
and, given that, how it fares epistemologically. Hellman treats the modal 
operator in question as a primitive (ibid., 8). Of course the modal notions 
should be primitive in sense (iii), which presupposes that their application 
poses no serious epistemological problems. More precisely, the epistemological 
problems, if any, of the modal notions should be distinctively less serious than 
the access problem for mathematical entities. 
Stewart Shapiro sees in Hellman’s strategy a fruitless attempt at a trade-off 
between ontology and modality, which cannot lead to a positive balance on the 
epistemological side (which he, too, presupposes to be the motivating concern 
behind nominalism/eliminativism): “Instead of an epistemology of abstract 
objects—numbers, sets, or structures—we now need an epistemology of 
possible abstract objects.” (Shapiro, 1993, 466) While I endorse the general drift 
of this complaint, note that Hellman is even more radical than Shapiro assumes. 
He explicitly rejects “quantification over abstract structures, possible worlds, or 
intensions” and declares Barcan’s formula not to hold for his modalities, so that 
the possible existence of a structure is not equivalent to the existence of a 
possible structure (Hellman, 1989, 16 f.). There can therefore allegedly be 
structural possibilities that do not involve ontological commitment to possible 
structures. I am not aware of any conclusive argument that would rule out this 
                                                 
7 Cf. Hellman 1989, 23. To be sure, it is my imputation that [H] serves as Hellman’s analysis of 
what it means to follow from the axioms. He himself only refers to it as the hypothetical 
component of φ’s modal structural interpretation. 
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possibility, but it surely leads to pressing questions: How are we to investigate 
or even understand structural possibilities and their limits without reference to 
possible structures or possible worlds? Hellman’s retreat from possibilia, 
though advisable to anyone with nominalistic intentions, has also moved him 
further away from our hard-earned customary understanding of modal notions. 
They are primitive, and we have to accept them or leave them, that is about all 
there is left to say about them.  
5. How Primitive is Modality? 
I have doubts about the implication, contained in Hellman’s required sense of 
primitiveness, that the modal concepts are epistemologically unproblematic in 
their application. My claim is that this is not only unsatisfying (because it does 
nothing to improve our understanding), but that it is misleading. The central 
question is: Does the nominalist make any epistemic gain by going modal? 
Hellman’s modalisations do not rest on a sophisticated epistemology of 
modality—and neither do those of Field or any other nominalist that I know of. 
Then what is their confidence in the epistemological lucrativeness of 
modalisation based on? My conjecture is that it is based on intuitions like the 
following:  
[I] It is intuitively clear that it is easier to explain how we can know that an ω-
sequence is possible than to account for our knowledge of abstract, a-
causal natural numbers.  
You may consider this a fourth, extended concept of primitiveness: (iv) A 
concept is primitive if its application is epistemologically harmless, i.e. if it is 
guaranteed and explainable that we know whether or not it applies in every 
relevant case, and if it is intuitively clear that it is guaranteed and explainable 
that we know whether or not it applies in every relevant case. This sense of 
primitiveness explains why some authors see no need for further 
epistemological explanations once a concept is declared primitive. If a workable 
epistemology of modality is absent, it is primitiveness in sense (iv) that 
structural possibilities need to possess. 
I do not deny that this idea has a certain appeal—especially when one 
regards a claim like [I], which seems quite plausible to me. However, by 
considering different examples of possibility claims, this sense of intuitive 
clarity often evaporates quickly. Let us begin close to home. In everyday 
circumstances, we often use modal notions where it seems obvious that they are 
primitive in sense (iv):  
[P1]  Yes, it is possible to leave the university building via that staircase. 
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Here, our knowledge of possibilities clearly derives from experience—personal 
or reported. We have been there, done that, therefore it must be possible. But 
possibility statements need not be that extremely concrete to appear perfectly 
harmless:  
[P2]  It is possible to correlate the Wonders of the Ancient World and the Deadly 
Sins one-to-one. 
No one of our personal acquaintances has ever been there, no one may ever 
have done that, and still: No one would really object that the grasp of this 
possibility requires access to abstract entities like possible structures or possible 
worlds, or so the nominalist may argue. 
I will not make a case that even everyday modal claims carry with them 
ontological commitments to possibilia or other abstract entities. In fact, I think 
that for homely examples like [P1], this would overshoot the mark. I also admit 
that it is plausible to extend this concession of intuitively clear epistemological 
innocence to some “structural” possibilities like [P2]. But this is only because in 
asserting [P2], though it is not directly based on experience like [P1], we are still 
extrapolating from experience. In other words: Our epistemic access to structural 
possibilities is unproblematic, and it is intuitively evident that this is so, as long 
as these possibilities are ultimately spatio-temporal possibilities, or more 
generally physical possibilities. I take it that we can arrive at physical 
possibilities by means of extrapolation from experience, in the sense that 
physically possible is whatever is not ruled out by the regularities that govern 
the physical world. We have, e.g., experience in collecting and correlating 
things, and we know from experience that there are few requirements for things 
to be correlated, except that they be distinct. Imagine for a moment a world 
where we could not have any such collecting and correlating experiences: [P2] 
would clearly not retain its appearance of intuitively evident epistemological 
innocence in that world. 
Of course, we live in this world where we do seem to be able to 
accumulate all kinds of experiences with structures. So if these experiences 
suffice to sustain a primitive modal notion of “structural possibility”, then what 
is the problem? The problem is that even in our world there are limitations to 
the kinds of structures we can gather experience about, and that these concrete 
structures will not suffice to provide the modal notions required for the 
complete body of classical mathematics.  
A radical case in point is set theory. Consider the following line of 
reasoning, adapted from Charles Parsons (who presented it in a different 
argumentative context; Parsons, 1983). Concrete structures, whatever they are 
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exactly, should in some sense be realised in space and time. We can understand 
this to imply that the concrete objects that constitute these structures should 
each be associated, however loosely or vaguely, with spacetime regions. To the 
best of our knowledge, the set of spacetime points has cardinality 02ℵ . The 
cardinality of the set of different spacetime regions, whatever gerrymandered 
or bizarre “regions” you may allow, can thus not exceed 
022
ℵ
. Therefore, even if 
we allow that several concrete objects may inhabitate exactly the same 
spacetime regions (as long as “several” does not mean more than 
022
ℵ
 again), 
the entirety of all concrete objects cannot surpass 
022
ℵ
 in cardinality. 
Mathematical set theory, in contrast, studies structures far beyond this 
limit. It requires, e.g., that there exist sets with cardinality ℶω, which is the 
smallest cardinality greater than all the cardinalities in the series 
0ℵ , 02
ℵ , 
022
ℵ
, … 
The possibility of structures with cardinality ℶω that mathematicians 
presuppose cannot implicitly indicate a physical possibility, nor can it be 
epistemically based on our experiences with concrete structural possibilities. As 
Parsons remarks: 
Whatever convinces us, for example, that “there is” a cardinal 
number ℶω [...] surely does not convince us that a structure of that 
cardinality having any but the most bloodless reality is possible: if 
concreteness demands causal efficacy, or perceivability in some 
strong sense, or temporality, or even some genuine individuality, we 
have no reason whatsoever to believe that ℶω can be concretely 
represented. (Parsons, 1983, 191 f.) 
Our confidence that a set of cardinality ℶω is possible can thus not rest on our 
belief that it is realisable in concrete objects and their relations. Accordingly, the 
claim that our epistemological access to this possibility is intuitively clear seems 
suddenly exceedingly far-fetched. This is because the sense of intuitive clarity is 
limited to those modalities that can, at least in principle, be recovered in the 
world of experience. It is surely tempting to claim that our epistemic access to a 
structural possibility like [P2] is less difficult than our access to the number 
seven. But how would this claim be justified if [P2] was not so closely related to 
spatio-temporal possibilities as it obviously is? How could it be extended to 
cover the structural possibilities presupposed by the set-theoretic hierarchy, 
which are surely not spatio-temporal or even remotely physical? 
I am not proposing that some sense of physical or nomological possibility 
represents the only meaningful notion of modality there is. The philosophical 
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discussion has certainly exposed a variety of other promising modal notions. 
However, their standard semantic frameworks already presuppose objects 
(possible worlds, trans-world identity relations and so forth) whose 
epistemological status is certainly not preferable, from a nominalist perspective, 
to that of, say, numbers. So in any case, a modality presupposed by the 
nominalist needs an epistemological short-cut around possible worlds. Obvious 
candidates would be physical and spatio-temporal possibilities in the actual 
world, but, as the above considerations have shown, this will not do. 
The perceived intuitive clarity of the epistemological innocence of 
structural possibilities is deceptive, I believe. The modality may therefore not be 
presupposed as primitive in sense (iv). But anyone who wanted to presuppose 
it as primitive in the weaker sense (iii) would have to supplement this 
declaration with an explicit justification of its epistemological innocence, 
presumably involving an epistemology of modal claims that fares without 
reference to abstract entities (at least without such abstract entities that are 
epistemologically as bad as numbers).8 
Modalities thus lead to epistemological problems that are no easier than 
the ones that epistemologically motivated nominalists wanted to escape from in 
the first place. It would be inappropriate to protest against this conclusion by 
insisting that it has not been demonstrated that the modalities lead to problems 
as long as there might still be a satisfying epistemology of the relevant modal 
claims. For in this respect, nominalistic modalists are exactly on a par with their 
realist competitors: For all we know, there might be an epistemology for 
numbers, sets and the like that deals with the nominalists’ worries. The gains 
expected from the nominalistic project are therefore not delivered; what we 
have instead is (at best) an epistemological tie. And in that case, it seems to be 
the most natural (and definitely the most naturalistic) choice to give preference 
to the hypothesis that preserves our everyday and scientific locutions by taking 
them at face value. Note again that all this critique does not affect Hellman’s 
own well-balanced position, but only those who would try to employ his 
eliminative Modal Structuralism for nominalistic purposes.9  
                                                 
8 My worry here is not just that nominalists have not provided one. The above considerations 
about the gap between physical possibilities and those structural possibilities presupposed in 
mathematics also cast into doubt the hope that an epistemology for the required modality can 
conceivably be provided on the basis of the purely concrete. But since I have no conclusive 
argument for this impossibility, I will insist only on the fact that it has not actually been 
achieved. 
9 Cf. Hellman 1989, 143 f., for his sober conclusions on the trade-off between the modal 
approach and platonism. 
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The modalisation, I conclude, is not apt to elucidate the consequence 
relation from a nominalistic standpoint—not in a way that advances our 
epistemic situation. And the consequence relation would need some elucidation 
because its claim to intuitive perspicuity does not extend beyond the most 
undemanding examples due to the threat of trivial satisfiability. So long as 
these problems are not solved, it is hard to imagine how the Evaluation 
Programme is ever supposed to work out. 
6. Fictionalism 
An evaluation of the Evaluation Programme alone cannot amount to an 
adequate appraisal of nominalism’s prospects of disposing of the 
epistemological problems. The Programme’s problems seem to arise from its 
pretence to provide all mathematical sentences with non-trivial truth values. 
But the nominalist still has an alternative to this venture: Fictionalism. 
However, I believe that the same problems that I have already identified within 
the Evaluation Programme surface again for the fictionalist. 
The view that mathematical statements do not really bear the truth-values 
we were once taught they bear is called Fictionalism, because it makes them 
resemble statements about fictional characters. “In Crete, there once lived a 
creature with a bull head and a human body” is to the best of our knowledge 
not a true statement, but it is licensed by Greek mythology, as opposed to, e.g. “The 
Minotaur was a duck in a sailor suit”, which is neither true nor licensed in any 
way whatsoever. In the same way, fictionalists will have to explain how the 
practice of mathematics succeeds in licensing some statements, such as 
“2 + 2 = 4”, and thus distinguishing them from others, like “2 + 2 = 5”, even 
though both are likewise false. 
As Stephen Yablo nicely puts it, Fictionalism in general turns 
mathematical entities into creatures of make-believe. Truth is not what matters 
about the statements concerning them, but rather validity within the fiction, or, 
in Yablo’s terms, within the make-believe game (henceforth “validity”, for 
short). From this point of view, the question is how a fiction or a game can flesh 
out such creatures sufficiently to determine, for any mathematical sentence, 
whether it is valid or not. For creatures of make-believe, as Yablo concedes, 
… tend to have not much more to them than what flows from our 
conception of them. The green-eyed monster has no ‘hidden 
substantial nature’; neither do the real-estate bug, the blue meanies, 
the chip on my shoulder, etc. (Yablo 2000, 225) 
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But how do all the valid or invalid statements about mathematical entities “flow 
from our conception of them”? The fictionalist too will have to look for means 
to distribute a binary characteristic over the totality of well-formed 
mathematical sentences—only it’s not the values TRUE and FALSE, but VALID 
and INVALID that must be distributed. And again, as in the case of the 
Evaluation Programme, the only candidate principle we have at our disposal to 
help make this infinite task manageable is the fact that mathematics is 
axiomatisable. For fictionalists, it can be put to service along the following lines: 
Our metamathematical investigations into the axiomatic structures of 
mathematics have shown us that the finite mathematical fictions manage to 
provide characterisations of the fictional entities they are about. So the 
statements licensed by the fiction are just those that follow from these 
characterisations. This is how the valid statements flow from our mathematical 
conceptions. The dependence of this general scheme on the notion of “following 
from characterisations” will bring with it problems analogous to those of the 
Evaluation Programme. What is at issue for the fictionalist purposes is the full-
blown notion of consequence; and I have argued that we need mathematical 
theories to get a grip on this notion.  
An analogous problem was first diagnosed for Hartry Field’s 
sophisticated version of Fictionalism. In Field’s view, the feature of 
mathematical statements that is relevant to their usefulness is not truth but 
conservativity (Field, 1980, ch.1). A statement counts as conservative if and only 
if we can add it to any nominalistic theory N and still be certain that no 
nominalistic statement follows from N+S that does not already follow from N 
alone. (A nominalistic theory or sentence is one that does not include reference 
to or quantification over abstract entities.) Reviewers immediately criticised that 
his main argument for conservativeness of classical mathematics S was a 
model-theoretic one,10 thus effectively establishing a notion of conservativeness 
that implicitly contained quantification over set-theoretic constructs (cf. 
Malament, 1982, esp. 530, Resnik, 1983, esp. 517 f. and Detlefsen, 1986, 22 f.). 
In response to this criticism, Field now maintains that the consequence 
relation in the definition of conservativeness is to be understood neither proof-
theoretically nor model-theoretically, but in terms of a primitive notion of 
logical possibility and necessity, where B being a consequence of A means 
nothing but □(A → B). According to Field, nominalists are nonetheless not left 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 16-19. He also provides a proof-theoretic argument, but this makes use of the 
completeness theorem and is thus restricted to first order languages, which are insufficient even 
for the nominalisation of Newtonian gravitation, as Field himself concedes: ibid., 38-40 and 115, 
note 30. 
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to their bare intuitions in evaluating logical possibility. They can make use of 
nominalistic versions of the usual metalogical devices. A sufficient criterion for 
logical possibility, e.g., is provided by a nominalistic version of the usual 
model-theoretic criterion: 
[M]  □(T → there is a model of A) → ◇A, 
where T is the mathematical theory that governs model theory, i.e. a finitely 
axiomatised set theory (Field, 1989, 108-110 and 1991, 11-17). Since belief in [M] 
does not presuppose belief in T, so the argument goes, nominalists too are fully 
entitled to use it in their explorations of logical possibility. Again, the problems 
of the fictionalist mirror those of the Evaluation Programme. While [M] does 
not depend on T, it surely presupposes ◇T, lest it be trivially satisfied. Now the 
nominalist is not to be blamed for not being able to provide a conclusive 
argument in favour of ◇T—for neither can anybody else. We all confidently 
hope that ◇T. But from the nominalist perspective, it is hard to see how “◇T” 
could even be understood. While for mathematical realists, it means that T is 
realised or realisable in abstract structures, for nominalists, this way to conceive 
of it is simply another Platonist blunder. There are no abstract structures, so 
nothing whatsoever could be realised by them. And, as we have seen before, T 
surely cannot be realised by concrete structures. In what sense can it 
nonetheless be comprehensible to assert that T is logically possible?  
Nominalistic versions of metalogical criteria, like [M], can therefore not 
help the nominalists to overcome the awkward epistemological situation that 
their appeal to primitive modal notions has created, because the 
trustworthiness of criterion [M] itself depends on a modal claim that is 
epistemologically problematic from a nominalistic point of view. This means 
that with Field, too, we are ultimately left with nothing but a modality we are 
supposed to accept as not being open to further explanation or analysis.11  
7. Conclusion 
In Field’s case, as in the case of the Evaluation Programme, it is the notion of 
consequence (this time embedded within the conservativeness concept) that 
proves at the same time to be indispensable and deeply problematic for the 
epistemological motivation nominalists. Without it, the nominalist cannot 
explain how mathematical practice succeeds in providing us with the vast 
entirety of mathematical statements—no matter whether their distinguishing 
feature is thought to be (non-referential) truth, or conservativeness, or some 
                                                 
11 For additional criticism of the unsolved epistemological problems of Field’s modal concepts, 
see Resnik 1985, 169-175, and Shapiro 1997, 219-227. 
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other kind of validity. But with it, she seems to be stuck with a notion that 
stands in need of explication, at least in so far as the full variety of consequence 
in classical mathematics is at issue, and that can only be satisfactorily explicated 
when totalities of abstract objects are included in our universe of discourse. 
The argument from the philosophy of logic is thus a serious problem for 
the epistemological motivation of nominalism, as our survey of the 
argumentative situation shows. No matter whether the nominalist prefers the 
Evaluation Programme or Fictionalism à la Field and no matter whether she 
offers a modalised or non-modalised account of the story—the epistemological 
problems at issue can always be rediscovered, incorporated in one of the 
concepts presupposed by the respective account. Also, the counter-intuitive 
appearance of the argument from the philosophy of logic can be dispelled. The 
explanation for the perceived innocence of logical and modal notions is that we 
have some pre-theoretic grasp of such notions that is rooted in common sense 
and everyday experience. But there is no straightforward way to extend this 
pre-theoretic grasp to include the full range of our advanced mathematised 
reasoning about the world. The philosophy of logic and a basic question of 
ontology are thus connected in a perspicuous way. Without a sufficiently rich 
ontology, the notion of consequence is vacuous. What exactly “sufficiently rich” 
means depends on the varieties of consequence our logic is expected to cover. If 
it includes mathematical consequence, then the ontology that is in demand 
clearly exceeds anything the consistent epistemologically motivated nominalist 
can offer. The argument from the philosophy of logic should therefore be 
regarded as a coherent and serious counter-argument against epistemological 
motivations for nominalism.* 
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